Abstract
This article offers a reconstruction of the main theses of cognitive structural realism in the philosophy of science, to examine its theoretical commitments and their viability. To this end, the connectionist version of P. M. Churchland and the predictive processing version of M. D. Beni are critically analyzed. Subsequently, the central theses of the position are identified and a distinction between strong and weak varieties of cognitive structural realism is proposed. Finally, some of its problems and potential developments are addressed.
STOA is a biannual publication edited by the Institute of Philosophy of the Universidad Veracruzana, Tuxpan, No. 29, Frac. Veracruz, C.P. 91020, Xalapa, Ver., Tel. 8154285, http://www.uv.mx/filosofia. Responsible editor: Jesús Turiso Sebastián. Exclusive Use Rights Reservation No. 04-2008-121012511200-203, granted by the Copyright Reservation Directorate of the National Institute of Copyright of the Secretariat of Public Education, ISSN: 2007-1868. Responsible for the last modification of this issue: Jesús Turiso Sebastián, Tuxpan, No. 29, Frac. Veracruz, C.P. 91020, date of last modification August 5, 2011. Distribution and digital support by the Academic Software Development Department of the Universidad Veracruzana.
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