Abstract
This paper presents some comparations and differences between Husserl’s thoughts about philosophy of science and the semantic view of scientific theories. This last conception affirms that empirical theories do not describe the world as it is, but that they represent it using models. However, according to Husserl, an essential part of a theory’s reconstruction is the mathematical description of its domain, that is, the world (or the part of the world) the theory intends to talk about but evoking its origin in the life-world.
STOA is a biannual publication edited by the Institute of Philosophy of the Universidad Veracruzana, Tuxpan, No. 29, Frac. Veracruz, C.P. 91020, Xalapa, Ver., Tel. 8154285, http://www.uv.mx/filosofia. Responsible editor: Jesús Turiso Sebastián. Exclusive Use Rights Reservation No. 04-2008-121012511200-203, granted by the Copyright Reservation Directorate of the National Institute of Copyright of the Secretariat of Public Education, ISSN: 2007-1868. Responsible for the last modification of this issue: Jesús Turiso Sebastián, Tuxpan, No. 29, Frac. Veracruz, C.P. 91020, date of last modification August 5, 2011. Distribution and digital support by the Academic Software Development Department of the Universidad Veracruzana.
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